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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Issue of Fragmentation of International Law: Select Case Studies
While many scholars and practitioners still perceive international
finance/investment law and human rights (“HR”) as “two separate branches of
international law, with no substantial overlap”, foreign investors’ rights have
clashed with the HR of the people of the investors’ host countries in a number of
recent cases brought before both domestic courts and international arbitral
1
2
tribunals. Pertinent examples in this respect are the cases before New York and
3
German courts of the so-called “vulture fund,” or hold-out bondholders against
4
Argentina. Other examples are the cases before the International Centre of
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunals of United States (“U.S.”)
5
equity investors in the Argentine energy sector against Argentina. These disputes
between the foreign debt investors and Argentina, the debt instrument issuer, as
well as the disputes between foreign equity investors and Argentina, the
investors’ host country, both arose in the context of the recent Argentine
6
financial crisis.

1. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of
International Investment Law and Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND ARBITRATION 45, 46 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
2. Lightwater Corp. v. Republic of Arg., No. 02 Civ. 3804(TPG), 2003 WL 1878420 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
2003); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 473 F.3d 463 (2nd Cir. 2007); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 131 F. App’x 745
(2nd Cir. 2005).
3. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 8, 2007, docket number 2 BvM
1/03 (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ms20070508_2bvm000103.html.
4. Mark Weisbrot, Vultures Circle Argentina, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jun/02/argentina-debt-us-vulture-funds.
5. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005),
44 I.L.M 1205 (2005), available at http://italaw.com/documents/CMS_FinalAward.pdf; Enron Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007), available at http://italaw.com/ documents/EnronAward.pdf; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007),
available at http://italaw.com/documents/SempraAward.pdf.
6. See Weisbrot, supra note 4.
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B. Background: The 2001-2002 Argentine Financial Crisis
At the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, Argentina experienced a
7
financial crisis of catastrophic proportions. The crisis began with Argentina’s
8
default on external debt obligations due to balance of payments difficulties.
Subsequently, the country imploded when, in one day alone, the Argentine peso
9
10
lost forty percent of its value. As the peso broke down, a run on banks ensued.
Throughout the collapse, “income per person in dollar terms . . . shrunk from
around $7,000 to just $3,500,” and unemployment rose to perhaps 25% in
11
Argentina.
This economic chaos meant that, by late 2002, over half the Argentine
population was living below the poverty line. The [financial] crisis soon spread
from the economic to the political sphere. In December 2001, one day of riots left
30 civilians dead and led to the resignation of President Fernando de la Rua, and
12
the collapse of the [Argentine] government.
13
Five presidents succeeded each other over the next ten days. In response to
the crisis, Argentina adopted, first unilaterally and later on the basis of the
International Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”) advice, several measures to stabilize the
14
economy and restore political confidence. “Among these efforts was a
significant devaluation of the peso through the termination of the currency board
which pegged the peso to the U.S. dollar, the pesification of all financial
obligations, and the effective freezing of all bank accounts through a series of
15
measures known collectively as the Corralito.” Argentina also announced its
16
wish to restructure the arrangements under its foreign currency bond issues.
Although “these measures offered a long-term prospect of restored economic

7. See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET, THE IMF AND THE
BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA 1-2 (2005). For details of the economic background of the Argentine financial crisis,
see INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE IMF AND ARGENTINA 1991-2001 (2004).
8. Weisbrot, supra note 4.
9. William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy
of the ICSID System, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 407
(Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
10. Id.
11. Argentina’s Collapse: A Decline without Parallel, ECONOMIST (Feb. 28, 2002), http://www.
economist.com/node/1010911.
12. Burke-White, supra note 9, at 409-10.
13. Id. at 410.
14. For data reproduced in the Report, see INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra
note 7, at 57-58.
15. Burke-White, supra note 9, at 410. For details on the Argentine situation and government intervention,
see BARRY EICHENGREEN, FINANCIAL CRISES: AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM 101-33 (2002).
16. Argentina’s Debt Restructuring: A Victory by Default?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2005),
http://www.economist.com/node/3715779?story_id=3715779.
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confidence and stability, they also imposed immediate and painful costs on all
17
participants in the Argentine economy, including foreign investors.”
While Argentina ultimately agreed with seventy-six percent of its creditors to
a settlement of approximately thirty-four cents on the dollar, several creditors not
participating in the debt restructuring continued pursuing their claims in national
18
courts and international arbitral forums. U.S. and German courts decided
unequivocally in favor of hold-out bondholders to whom, at least on paper,
19
Argentina still owed one-hundred percent of the original debt. Similarly, several
20
equity investors fought Argentina successfully before ICSID tribunals.
II. INVESTORS’ RIGHTS VERSUS HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Hold-Out Bondholders Versus Argentina in U.S. Courts
Litigation in U.S. courts resulted in the bondholders winning their cases on
the merits because the courts rejected defenses that are traditionally available to
the sovereign, such as the act of state doctrine, sovereign immunity, and the
21
doctrine of comity. Instead, the U.S. courts immediately focused on the breach
22
of the bond contract explicitly waiving immunity on Argentina’s part. However,

17. Burke-White, supra note 9, at 410.
18. Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 335 (2006). For details of the debt restructuring agreement between Argentina and willing bond holders,
see Gabriel Gomez-Giglio, A New Chapter in the Argentine Saga: The Restructuring of the Argentine Sovereign
Debt, J. INT’L BANKING L. no. 2, 2005, at 345.
19. See supra notes 2-3.
20. Recently, bond holders also took Argentina before ICSID. The bond holders’ cases are still pending.
See Giovanna Beccara & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5; Giovanni Alemanni et al. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8; and Giordano Alpi et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/9. List of Pending Cases, ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Gen
CaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (last updated Mar. 4, 2012). In the first case, which was renamed Abaclat et
al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, a decision on jurisdiction and admissibility of the
bondholders’ claims supported by two of the three arbitrators of the ICSID tribunal opening ICSID’s jurisdiction to
the claims was issued in August 2011. Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/documents/
AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf. In a dissenting opinion, arbitrator George Abi-Saab heavily criticized the
majority decision arguing that sovereign bondholders’ claims would—as portfolio investments are at stake that are
traded in the secondary capital markets with high velocity and a remoteness vis-à-vis the territory of the sovereign
issuer as well as vis-à-vis the development of the sovereign issuer’s economy—not qualify as investments for
which the ICSID Convention sought to create facilities to arbitrate investment disputes between foreign investors
and host countries. Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissenting Opinion of
Arbitrator Professor George Abi-Saab (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat
DecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
21. For a recap of the decline in U.S. courts’ acceptance of traditional sovereign defenses, see Charles D.
Schmerler, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES AND DEBT
RESTRUCTURINGS 431 (James R. Silkenat & Charles D. Schmerler eds., 2006).
22. See Lightwater Corp. v. Republic of Arg., No. 02 Civ. 3804(TPG), 2003 WL 1878420 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
14, 2003); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 473 F.3d 463 (2nd Cir. 2007).
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enforcement of these judgments in the bondholders’ favor turned out to be a
more difficult affair than initially thought, to the extent that U.S. courts actually
yielded their precedence so as not to jeopardize the Argentine debt restructuring
23
schemes’ implementation. While HR issues were not explicitly argued, the New
York courts exercised discretion with respect to pre- and post-judgment remedies
by vacating the hold-out bondholders’ remedies “in order to avoid a substantial
risk to the successful conclusion of the debt restructuring . . . [which] is
24
obviously of critical importance to the economic health of a nation.” However,
once Argentina settled with seventy-six percent of the bondholders participating
in the debt restructuring, hold-out bondholders had no technical problems
25
enforcing their judgments.
B. Hold-Out Bondholders Versus Argentina in German Courts
Holders of Argentine bonds that traded on the Frankfurt Exchange ended up
even better off. Proceedings brought against the Republic of Argentina before the
first instance courts in Frankfurt, Germany resulted in a full victory for the
plaintiffs after the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, Germany rejected
the argument that a “general rule of public international law” existed—which, by
virtue of Article 25 of the German constitution applied directly within the
German legal order—possibly allowing a government to suspend payment on its
26
debt obligations in a state of economic emergency. Apparently in complete
ignorance of the long-standing practice for over three decades of the so-called
27
“three ring circus” of sovereign debt restructuring based on (i) IMF and World
Bank bail-out measures in a first ring, (ii) Paris Club restructuring of bilateral
official debt in a second ring, and (iii) restructuring of debt owed to private
creditors in the London Club in the third ring, the German Constitutional Court’s
majority decision found that a general rule assisting sovereigns in suspending
payments on external debt does not exist temporarily without “a uniform or
23. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 131 F. App’x 745 (2nd Cir. 2005).
24. Id. at 747.
25. Gomez-Giglio, supra note 18, at 345.
26. Beate Rudolf & Nina Hüfken, Joined Cases Nos. 2 BvM 1-5/03 & 2 BvM 1-2/06, 101 AM. J. INT’L L.
857 (2007). Under Article 25 of the German constitution, “allgemeine Regeln des Völkerrechts” (or general rules
of public international law) are directly effective and applicable within the German legal order, and trump German
statutes, which contain contradicting provisions. Following the jurisprudence of the BVerfG, such general rules of
public international law include universal customary law and general principles of international law in the sense of
sources of international law listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179; see GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. art. 25 (Ger.); see 2
BvM 1/03, at para. 31 (Ger.).
27. The term “three-ring-circus” was coined by Daniel D. Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte,
Negotiating International Financial Transactions, UNITAR e-learning course, offered via UNITAR’s webpage.
Daniel D. Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Negotiating Int’l Fin. Transactions e-Learning Course for
UNITAR (Nov. 25-Oct. 31, 2011) (on file with Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal).
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28

codified insolvency law for sovereign states.” Moreover, the state of emergency
rule reflected in Article 25 of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) Articles
on State Responsibility is inapplicable in non-public international law scenarios
in which a private creditor extended credit to a sovereign debtor on the basis of
29
waived immunity arrangements.
The German Constitutional Court’s majority decision distinguished the
private creditor-sovereign debtor relationship from the private foreign investorhost country relationship which is, among others, regulated by instruments such
as bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), the ICSID Convention, and individual
contracts between an investor and the host country. Adopting an antiquated
“black and white” analysis without hesitation, the German Constitutional Court
deemed BITs and the ICSID Convention to be public international law
instruments, a qualification that overlooked the rather special nature of these
instruments because these instruments eliminate the classical investor homestate’s discretionary exercise of diplomatic protection on behalf of the foreign
investor by virtue of substituting classical public international law statesovereign powers with direct investor rights.
To her credit, Justice Lübbe-Wolff in her dissenting opinion criticized the
30
majority decision’s “black and white” analysis. Justice Lübbe-Wolff also
recognized the customary law principle of economic emergency, particularly as a
result of a sovereign’s unequivocal obligations to uphold superior, international
31
law guarantees such as HR. In terms of threats to people’s lives and health, the
extreme consequences of the Argentine financial crisis on its population were
deemed sufficient grounds to warrant Argentina’s chosen intervention, i.e. the
temporary suspension of payments to foreign creditors to protect HR by
preventing social unrest from taking its own dangerous, and potentially life32
threatening, course.
C. U.S. Equity Investors Versus Argentina in the International Centre of
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
Like the U.S. and German court decisions, the majority of ICSID tribunals
awarded damages ranging in the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollar to foreign

28. Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Sustainable Development and Sovereign Debt: “Sustainable Sovereign
Debt” in Courts, Arbitral Tribunals, and IMF/World Bank Policy (June 16, 2011) (on file with Pacific McGeorge
Global Business & Development Law Journal); see 2 BvM 1/03, at para. 32 (noting that “[d]as Völkerrecht kennt
weder ein einheitliches noch ein kodifiziertes Konkursrecht der Staaten” [international law has neither a uniform
nor a codified law of state bankruptcy).
29. See 2 BvM 1/03, at paras. 32-33; see also G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
30. 2 BvM 1/03, at paras. 72-73.
31. See id. at paras. 81, 87.
32. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41029, ARGENTINA’S DEFAULTED SOVEREIGN DEBT:
DEALING WITH THE “HOLDOUTS” 3 (2010).

414

[17] SCHLEMMER-SCHULTE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

9/10/2012 3:07 PM

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 25
33

equity investors. Applying domestic contracts law and international treaties
(BITs and the ICSID Convention), the tribunals found that Argentina breached
34
the contracts it had with foreign investors. These contracts extended exclusive
licenses to foreign investors for thirty-five years and required Argentina to
purchase energy from foreign investors who had acquired local energy firms in
connection with a privatization program of government-owned industries and
public utilities on the basis of tariffs to be calculated in U.S. dollars and were
adjusted every six months in accordance with U.S.-Producer Price Index (“U.S.
35
PPI”). The tribunals found further that Argentina violated standards for the
36
protection of foreign investment under the U.S.-Argentina BIT. The tribunals
rejected the argument that Argentina’s monetary policy measures were justified
because of an economic emergency under either the special BIT provisions or
37
customary international law. Although the tribunals found that Argentina’s
measures fell short of an illegal expropriation, the tribunals agreed that full
38
compensation for losses was due. In particular, the tribunals applied the fair
market value formula to calculate damages resulting in the full amount of lost
39
tariff revenues through the licenses’ thirty-five year term were awarded.
None of the tribunals accepted Argentina’s argument that, under its
constitution as well as international HR instruments, Argentina was obliged to
intervene in the crisis via monetary policy actions to prevent widespread social
40
unrest. While all of the tribunals explicitly or implicitly referred to the 1969
33. See supra notes 5, 20 and accompanying text. It remains to be seen whether the ICSID tribunals dealing
with the claims of holders of sovereign bonds issued by Argentina follow suit and render similarly big awards to
foreign portfolio investors/bondholders.
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
35. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, paras. 54-58,
(May 12, 2005), 44 ILM 1205 (2005), available at http://italaw.com/documents/CMS_FinalAward.pdf.
36. See id. at 139-40.
37. Id. at 104. Note that one of the decisions (CMS Decision) was partially annulled. See CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annulment Proceeding, para. 44 (Sept. 25,
2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docId=DC687_En&caseId=C4. Note, however, that, based on the limited grounds for annulment, the annulment
committee, while criticizing the award for flawed analysis in connection with the concepts of necessity in the
format of custom or treaty norm, could neither find that the ICSID tribunal failed to state reasons nor that it
manifestly exceeded its powers in the sense of Art. 52(1) ICSID Convention. Id. at 31-36. For a comprehensive
analysis of ICSID tribunals’ handling of Argentina’s emergency defense, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency
Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 459 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).
38. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ARB/01/8, Award, paras. 73-77; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, paras. 75-80 (May 22, 2007), available at http://italaw.com/docuemnts/ EnronAward.pdf; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, paras. 79-85 (Sept.
28, 2007), available at http://italaw.com/documents/SempraAward.pdf.
39. The fair market value measures an enterprise’s value on the basis of the DCF (discount cash flow)
method which in essence includes the net present value of future earnings in any amounts of damages in addition to
moneys invested in the past. See CMS Gas Transmission Co., ARB/01/8, Award, paras. 411-17.
40. Id. at paras. 91-109; Enron Corp., ARB/01/3, Award, paras. 91-107; Sempra Energy Int’l, ARB/02/16,
Award, paras. 96-115. Note that one ICSID tribunal which is not referred to above in footnote 4 accepted the notion
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) in interpreting the relevant
BIT and the ICSID Convention, none of the tribunals ever mentioned the explicit
reference to HR in the preamble of the VCLT or the VCLT’s reference to other
41
relevant rules of international law in Article 31(3)(c). None of the tribunals
seriously discussed the issue of conflicting norms of international economic law
and HR (or sovereign monetary policy); by contrast, the tribunals seemed to be
42
blind on the HR issues, let alone deem the HR issues to be jus cogens.
Similarly, no questions were raised regarding “unconscionable contracts” for the
license arrangements, or “fundamental change of circumstances” as to the narrow
43
economic emergency provisions of the BIT.
III. APPROACHES TO FRAGMENTATION ISSUES
A. Taking Stock: The Current Trend in Favor of Foreign Investors
The above cases of foreign debt and equity investors before domestic courts
and international arbitral forums illustrate that, while proliferation of
international law led to fragmentation and in turn may result in conflicts between
norms of equal authority under our current system of international law, domestic
courts and international arbitral tribunals facing the tension between several
international law norms tend to favor the private corporate actors over sovereign
44
debtors/host countries of foreign investment. This tendency is not surprising
since these corporate actors, because of their bargaining power, directly or
indirectly influenced the design of the sources of law in the first place, i.e.
45
loan/bond contracts, license contracts, and BITs applicable to their investments.
of an economic emergency in Argentina’s case. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Award (July 27, 2007), available at http://italaw.com/documents/ LGEEnglish_003.pdf.
41. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ARB/01/8, Award, para. 89; Enron Corp., ARB/01/3, Award, paras. 65,
83, 87; Sempra Energy Int’l, ARB/02/16, Award, paras. 69, 112.
42. See generally CMS Gas Transmission Co., ARB/01/8, Award; Enron Corp., ARB/01/3, Award; Sempra
Energy Int’l, ARB/02/16, Award.
43. See generally CMS Gas Transmission Co., ARB/01/8, Award; Enron Corp., ARB/01/3, Award; Sempra
Energy Int’l, ARB/02/16, Award.
44. Based on the above discussed cases and for further reasons, several scholars diagnosed a backlash
against investment arbitration. See THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND
REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010). Some scholars even called into question the legitimacy of international
investment arbitration. See Burke-White, supra note 9. Other scholars suggested renegotiating BITs. See Marc
Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, 2010 HUM. RTS, CORP. RESP. & SUSTAINABLE
DEV. 33-34.
45. An unusual side effect of the domestic courts and international arbitral tribunals’ decisions was that, on
the international plane, portfolio investors normally lose something in sovereign borrowing cases (the
overwhelming majority of lenders have always agreed to restructure debt to the extent that some debt forgiveness
can be called the norm by now), whereas equity investors whose riskier investments would be lost in a domestic
bankruptcy case prevail over lenders. See Louis T. Wells, Backlash to Investment Arbitration: Three Causes, in
THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 341, 344-45 (Michael Waibel
et al. eds., 2010) (noting that the longstanding practice by the majority of bondholders to agree to restructuring of
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B. The Proliferation and Changing Nature of International Law
From a broader international law perspective, the conflict between two or
more primary norms of international law results from the proliferation of
substantive international law rules. Primary substantive norms of international
law are not necessarily always crafted by their authors to avoid conflicts with
other international law norms established in different contexts. The ensuing issue
of fragmentation of international law is systemic because the current international
law system offers only a few rudimentary mechanisms to avoid conflicts among
46
divergent substantive international law rules. Rules on peremptory norms or jus
47
cogens are among these few mechanisms. Under Article 53 VCLT, jus cogens
trumps conflicting inferior norms in the otherwise flat and non-hierarchical
48
sphere of international law. Further sources of public international law such as
international treaties, customary law, and general principles of international law
49
are all equal. Other means that could be used to assist in eliminating perceived
conflicts of primary norms of international law include tools that focus on
chronology or speciality, e.g. lex posterior trumps legi anteriori, and lex specialis
trumps legi generali.
None of the rules or tools listed even address the problem of a growing body
of international law of a blurred nature, i.e., the body of law that cannot easily be
qualified as either public international law or domestic law. Therefore, this
growing body of international law may not be subject to the above noted
rudimentary set of tools which manage conflicts between international law
norms, nor may it be easily reigned-in based on domestic law hierarchies. Public
international law is the body of law created by, and applicable to, states and
international organizations: the classical subjects of public international law,
dealing with each other. Domestic law applies to private individuals’ (natural and
legal persons) dealings with each other. Based on the traditional approach, in
which there are only two spheres of law (public international or domestic),
numerous activities in the global economy risk being wrongly characterized or to
remain in limbo. In fact, many global commercial activities are so complex that
they comprise a range of features, running from public international law elements
debt, i.e. willingness to incur losses, as opposed to equity investors’ recourse to arbitration for full satisfaction
“creates a topsy-turvy world where foreign direct investors stand ahead of debt holders in the queue for claims in
crises”).
46. For a comprehensive analysis of the issue of fragmentation of international law, see Rep. of the Int’l
Law Comm’n, 57th sess, May 2–June 3, July 11–Aug. 5, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/60/10; GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No.
10 (2005).
47. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
48. Id.; see Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (2006)
(discussing the interface of jus cogens, erga omnes, and U.N. charter norms with other norms of international law
and the possible superiority of the former norms over the latter norms).
49. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179
(implying equality to all three of the listed sources of international law).
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in the traditional sense (mixed elements), to domestic law elements in one single
arrangement. Many arrangements actually open their very own chapter of
international law and deliberately refrain from referencing classical public
international law or any domestic law by creating their own legal terms of
reference. Among the areas of a blurred nature in the sense of the traditional
distinction between public international and domestic law are parts of foreign
50
investment law and the body of law created by the international financial
institutions (“IFIs”). For example, the IFIs’ direct cooperation with private
investors in connection with international development finance is difficult to put
into either traditional category of law. While the participating IFIs such as the
World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) are blessed with immunity from the
jurisdiction of national courts by virtue of their founding charter when
cooperating with private investors, the agreements these IFIs enter into with their
counterparts deliberately lack a reference to applicable public international law or
51
domestic law. The agreements themselves create a new species of international
law following policies primarily adopted by the IFIs internally, which are
52
reproduced as financing conditionalities in the financial agreements. In terms of
the legal nature, the same analysis applies to the thousands of credit
arrangements entered into by the IMF and the World Bank with their borrowing
member countries. This is because the IMF and the World Bank have
categorically refrained from ratifying the Second Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, and instead insist that the terms of their lending arrangements—
rather than any public international contract law (treaty or custom)—are the sole
53
source of law applicable to their economic activities.

50. While BITs as well as the host countries’ tax codes and so forth may be easily identified as public
international law and domestic law respectively, the millions of contracts between foreign investors and host
countries, as wells as all jurisprudence and arbitral awards related to foreign direct investment (“FDI”), are better
classified as a new special species of international law without the public or private as a qualifying adjective in
front of them. See Christian Tietje & Alexander Szodruch, Staatsnotstand bei Staateninsolvenz—Individualrechte
und Gemeinwohlbelange im transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht [State of Emergency in States Bankruptcy], 6
Zeitchrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft [ZBB] 498 (2007) (Ger.) (stressing that the ICSID Convention
explicitly prohibits the intervention of an investor’s state of origin and the latter’s exercise of diplomatic protection
in Article 27, Section 1, the moment the investor has started arbitration proceedings against a host state, in effect
devoiding these proceedings of public international law nature).
51. See generally Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Sovereign Debt: The Argentine Bonds Case, in FRIEDEN IN
FREIHEIT: PEACE IN LIBERTY: PAIX EN LIBERTÉ 973, 989 (Andreas Fischer-Lescano et al. eds., 2008). The World
Bank provides guarantees to private investors or lenders, enters into co-financing arrangements with private firms,
and engages in private-public-partnerships. The IFC lends to private productive enterprises as well as invests equity
in them. The MIGA provides political risk insurance for private investors investing in developing countries. Id.
52. See generally id. at 990-94.
53. With their activities, the IFIs have opened a new chapter of international law which is largely
independent from public international law or domestic law. The IFIs’ self-created body of law (rules, processes,
and even new institutions such as the World Bank Inspection Panel applying this law) distinguishes itself from
classical public international law in the sense that it contains quasi-enforcement mechanisms. The IFIs’ lending
arrangements include clauses on suspension, cancellation of loans, acceleration of maturity in the case of default of
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Most scholars view fragmentation as problematic, while the report of ILC’s
Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law seems to identify “the
rapid expansion of international legal activity into various new fields and
54
diversification of its objects and techniques” as positive developments—to the
extent that it appears that the report sees fragmentation of international law and
55
related conflicts of various primary norms as possibly healthy competition.
Consequently, scholars have made various suggestions on how to remedy the
specific fragmentation issue arising in developing countries’ financial crises and
resulting in tensions between the rights of foreign (debt and equity) investors as
well as the HR of host country citizens. The non-exhaustive list of suggestions
includes the following approaches: (i) Article 31(3)(c) VCLT; (ii) HR as jus
cogens and/or erga omnes norms; (iii) clausula rebus sic stantibus (fundamental
change of circumstances); (iv) general principles of international law such as
unconscionable contracts concepts; (v) constitutionalization of international law;
(vi) soft law codes of ethics for multinational corporations; and (vii)
comprehensive reform of the framework for the global economy.
C. De lege lata Approaches to Fragmentation
1. Harmonizing Investment Protection and HR Based on Article 31(3)(c) of
56
the VCLT
In order to solve the tension between rights claimed by investors under BITs,
investment contracts, and international custom on the one hand and HR claimed
by the host country on behalf of its people on the other, an interpretation of BITs
and further international norms protecting foreign investors in light of
57
international HR on the basis of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT has been suggested.

payment, etc. The IFI borrowers are aware of these clauses and abide by the IFI lending arrangements’ terms to
avoid sanctions from the IFIs. See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Internationales Währungs—und Finanzrecht, in
INTERNATIONALES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 375 (Christian Tietje ed., 2009).
54. See Fragmentation of Int’l Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of Int’l
Law, Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, at 8, 14 (Apr.
13, 2006).
55. See Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About
International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 9 (2007).
56. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 47, at art. 31(3)(c).
57. See Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human
Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 678,
682 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009); Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, Human Rights and International
Investment Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82 (PierreMarie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersman eds., 2009); Anne van Aaken, Fragmentation of
International Law: The Case of International Investment Protection, (Univ. of St. Gallen Law Sch., Working Paper
No. 2008-1, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097529 (illustrating fragmentation issues in international
investment law and making the case that harmonious interpretation of non-investment law related to investment
cases by investment arbitration bodies carries the danger of de facto overruling of judicial bodies democratically
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While international arbitral tribunals deciding investment disputes have been
accused of solely reverting to investment law and turning a blind eye to HR
58
norms, HR arguments made by host countries may actually be easily adopted
and integrated into the legal analysis by arbitrators of international investment
disputes. The explicit reference to HR in the preamble of the VCLT, as well as
the reference of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT to “any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties,” opens the door for the adoption
of international/regional HR regimes and their integration into an arbitral
59
tribunal’s analysis of investment law cases.
Such inclusion of the HR arguments is further encouraged by compromissory
clauses laid out in BITs and/or in the contract, as well as Article 42 ICSID
Convention featuring yet another explicit reference to applicable rules of
60
international law, including HR law. It should be noted that such inclusion of
HR arguments has been suggested not only as an argument for a host country’s
emergency measures in financial crises, but also in connection with a host
country’s general regulation of foreign investors’ businesses outside crisis
61
contexts.
2. HR as jus cogens and/or erga omnes Norms
Elevating HR norms to the category of jus cogens—which, as peremptory
norms of international law, would then trump investors’ rights derived from BITs
62
or custom—has also been suggested. While there is consensus that some HR
have indeed achieved the status of peremptory norms, there is also consensus that
63
most have not. Hence, in the alternative, host countries may possibly rely on the
erga omnes character of HR to solve the tension between investors’ rights and
64
their own people’s HR in support of regulatory measures. As erga omnes
obligations or obligations owed to the international community as a whole,
certain HR obligations deserve more attention than other international
empowered with the original competence of dealing with the respective interpretation issues).
58. See LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KEVIN R. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION 24, 33-34 (2003), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_
rights_bits.pdf.
59. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 47, at pmbl., art. 31(3)(c).
60. See Dupuy, supra note 1, at 56.
61. See Simma & Kill, supra note 57.
62. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 8, 2007, docket number 2
BvM 1/03, paras. 86-87 (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ms20070508_2bvm
000103.html.
63. Examples of HR with jus cogens status include the prohibition of slavery, torture, genocide, racial
discrimination, and apartheid. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 720-21 (5th ed. 2003).
64. See the ICJ’s obiter dictum in Barcelona Traction. 1970 I.C.J. 32; see also THEODOR MERON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 188-215 (1989) (highlighting that HR obligations may
be among those owed by states erga omnes).
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obligations, including investor protections, because of the public interest
character of HR.
3. The Fundamental Change of Circumstances
Both BIT necessity clauses and Article 25 ILC Articles necessity defense
reflect the concept of a possible deviation from the pacta sunt servanda
65
obligation in the instance of a fundamental change of circumstances. While the
BIT and ILC Articles necessity concepts may invariably differ in terms of
substantive content and a determination as to the relationship between them is of
crucial importance, it suffices here to stress the fact that both the treaty-based
emergency exceptions and the necessity defense under customary international
law may be explored for their inherent HR arguments in financial crisis situations
66
of the investors’ host country.
4. General Principles of International Law Based on Unconscionable
Contracts Concepts
Aside from BIT provisions and customary international law, another strong
argument tipping the balance in favor of HR may be found in the unconscionable
contracts concepts of the common law, civil law, and further domestic law
jurisdictions, which, if taken together, rise to the level of general principles of
67
international law.
D. De lege ferenda Approaches to Fragmentation
1. The Constitutional Hierarchy for International Law
In response to fragmentation issues in international law, a
constitutionalization of international law norms similar to the multilevel
68
governance norms in domestic legal systems has been called for. The

65. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 47, at art. 62.
66. For details regarding a possibly different substantive content and the relationship between treaty-based
and customary emergency clauses, see Christina Binder, Changed Circumstances in Investment Law: Interfaces
between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility with a Special Focus on the Argentine Crisis, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 608 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
67. For an analysis of the unconscionable contracts concept under U.S. contracts law, see Wells, supra note
45, at 341; see also KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW: THE INSTITUTIONS
OF PRIVATE LAW 61-70 (1987) (surveying common law and civil law contracts concepts that allow invalidation of
contracts that are contrary to “public policy”); see, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug.
18, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, §138(1) (declaring null and void contracts which
contravene society’s sense of morals and justice).
68. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Constitutionalism, and ‘Public Reason’ in Investor-State
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 877 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
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constitutionalizing international law movement has been driven by the HR
bodies’ view that economic freedoms—including labor rights that protect
collective bargaining, private contract law, and property rights—are legal
preconditions for self-governance in civil societies and for competition in
economic markets, just as much as the constitutional protection of HR is a legal
69
precondition for democratic self-governance in political markets. While
“multilevel economic constitutionalism” and “multilevel HR law” supposedly
complement each other, the world is far from having achieved such a
70
constitutionalization of international law.
2. Soft Law Solutions: International Corporate Social Responsibility
In light of the scarcity of domestic regulation in many capital-importing
countries and the lack of investor regulation via BITs or custom, strong voices
throughout the investor responsibilities debate have promoted international
71
corporate social responsibility (“ICSR”). ICSR obligations have been
considered the flipside of investor protection in an otherwise weak regulatory
environment in which multinational corporations (“MNCs”) are believed to enjoy
72
impunity. While a binding nature is absent, let alone any enforcement
mechanisms, the entire ICSR concept remains a questionable one, but ICSR may
at least shine some light on dubious MNC practices from the HR perspective, and
thereby contribute to a change in MNC practices. It is hoped that ICSR soft law
is converted into hard law.
3. Comprehensive Reform of the Rules of the Game for the Global Economy
Primarily for economic development reasons rather than HR reasons, an
73
overhaul of the rules of the game for the global economy has been suggested.
Based on a combination of IMF/Bank conditionalities, the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) bargained for commitments to reduce trade barriers and
69. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of International
Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 407 (2003).
70. See Petersmann, supra note 68, at 882.
71. See Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 637 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008);
Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International
Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2006).
72. See Shedrack C. Agbakwa, A Line in the Sand: International (Dis)Order and the Impunity of Non-State
Corporate Actors in the Developing World, in THE THIRD WORLD ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW,
POLITICS, AND GLOBALIZATION 1 (Antony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Karin Mickelson & Obiora Okafor eds.,
2003).
73. See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Die Rolle der Internationalen Finanzorganizsationen im Nord-SüdKonflikt, in DAS INTERNATIONALE RECHT IM NORD-SÜD-VERHÄLTNIS 149 (Werner Meng et al. eds., 2005);
Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 51, at 1012.
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74

thousands of BIT-based standards. This framework for the global economy
relies on the idea of relative liberalization of economies and relative deregulation
75
with an in-built North-South imbalance due to different bargaining powers. As
promoted by the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and BITs, the details of the
rules of the game reflect asymmetries between North and South from an
76
economic perspective. The rules provide primarily for a one-way-street with the
South giving full access to its markets to the North, but the North only
reciprocating to a much smaller degree and maintaining relatively huge trade
77
barriers. From a legal perspective, irrespective of a formal equality between
Northern and Southern governments, the material substance of the rules of the
game for global trade, investment, and financial and capital movements between
the North and South are neither uniform nor harmonized, and are inherently
78
discriminatory in light of the South’s disadvantages.
IV. CONCLUSION
The existing regime of international finance and investment law, taken in
isolation, seems to privilege creditors/investors from capital-exporting countries
over sovereign debtors/capital-importing host countries. The terms and
conditions of international sovereign bond issues, and the terms and conditions
under BITs for equity investments—possibly also extending to portfolio
79
investments such as sovereign bonds traded on secondary markets —carry
primarily binding obligations towards creditors/investors from capital-exporting
nations. In the particular context of BITs, there are no reciprocal requirements for
the investor to carry responsibilities. Likewise, taken separately, the regime of
international HR law is fraught with defects, mainly a lack of enforcement
mechanisms. However, international practice of courts and arbitral forums is not

74. Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 51, at 1014.
75. Id. at 1013.
76. For a case study illustrating North-South asymmetries, see LIFE AND DEBT (Tuff Gong Pictures 2003).
77. From an economist perspective, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002), JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS: HOW WASHINGTON MISMANAGED
GLOBALIZATION (2000), and WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’
ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2001).
78. Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 51, at 1013.
79. See Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf (finding
that ICSID’s jurisdiction covers sovereign bonds as does the applicable Italy-Argentina BIT). This decision
opening—in addition to the domestic courts designated under the bonds contracts as the competent courts to
address claims by aggrieved bondholders—an international arbitral forum as another supplemental avenue for
creditors of sovereign debtors may be another setback for the human rights of the people of the host country in light
of the general trend of ICSID tribunals to give priority to business investors’ rights based on BITs. It may also
frustrate international efforts of meaningful sovereign debt restructuring in the absence of an international
bankruptcy procedure for sovereigns mired in debt and default. See Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box:
Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711 (2007).
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necessarily supposed to treat every specialized rule-system as independent from
80
the rest of international law. As noted above, there are de lege lata tools
available that allow these courts and forums to apply international
finance/investment law and international HR law in tandem. The combined
application of international finance/investment law and international HR law may
reduce the imbalances in the specialized field of international finance/investment
law. At the same time, the combination may also add teeth to international HR
law in terms of enforcement until policy-makers, in the long-term, agree on de
lege ferenda measures to help solve the problems caused by the fragmentation of
81
international law.

80. One of the few areas of international law that has skillfully meandered around other specialized regimes
of international law and may indeed continue to qualify as an autonomous, self-contained regime is the IFI created
body of law. For details regarding how the IFIs managed to remove themselves from much of the rest of
international law, see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, International Monetary Fund, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2011); Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger
Wolfrum ed., 2011); Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, THE WORLD BANK, MONOGRAPH, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS—INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (forthcoming 2012).
81. This approach to fragmentation of international finance/investment law and international HR law would
also address a major concern of Philip Alston, an eminent HR lawyer. According to Alston, the HR community has
mostly failed to effectively engage with the development agenda. See Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night:
The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium
Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755 (2005).
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